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 Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, knowledge and business 
institution sources on the discourse on reshaping Global Value Chains (GVCs) as a result of the 
current Covid-19 pandemic and how GVC support programmes might have to adapt to the “new 
normal”. This review concludes that lead firms in GVCs could decide to diversify suppliers, 
reshore (near-shore) production closer to demand or intensify linkages with existing 
suppliers. Which strategy firms embrace depends on the sector and the degree of complexity of 
the supply chain and aims to increase the resilience of GVCs. The literature is clear that e-
commerce and digitalisation are essential tools to increase resilience in GVCs.  
The Covid-19 pandemic has shown the importance of a better understanding of GVCs in 
relation to epidemic outbreaks. Queiroz et al. (2020) and Ivanov (2020a) conclude that the 
topic has still to be adequately investigated, and very much is still unknown. The literature also 
mentions that there is now an opportunity for building inclusive and sustainable GVCs, 
although few sources provide the empirical evidence to support that this is actually happening. 
What do we know about the impact of Covid-19 on GVCs? 
The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on GVCs can be distinguished between supply-side 
and demand-side impacts, direct and indirect impacts, and short-term and medium- to 
longer-term impacts. While these impacts eventually affect all producers in the value chain, the 
financial burden is unlikely to be shared equally across the chain. Protecting own cash position to 
ensure continuity in the short-term will likely come at the expense of chain partners to a 
considerable degree, particularly SMEs down the supply chain (Meester & Ooijens, 2020). 
By using simulation models, researchers found that Covid-19 will mostly disrupt sectors 
that depend more on GVCs, particularly the most tightly integrated into the global supply 
chains (Strange, 2020; Bonadio et al., 2020). It has also been measured that GVCs are 
responsible for a sizeable degree of the overall GDP contraction, amplifying the magnitude of 
domestic shocks. Furthermore, global supply chain losses seem largely dependent on the 
number of countries imposing restrictions and that losses are more sensitive to the duration of a 
lockdown than its strictness (Guan et al., 2020).  
The current debate focuses on how GVCs should change due to disruptions initiated by the 
pandemic. Some scholars believe that the combination of trade-policy shocks (increased 
protectionism) and Covid-19 could irreversibly accelerate the transformation of GVCs (Javorcik, 
2020; Lin & Lanng, 2020). However, there is also some reservation amongst scholars to 
rush into conclusions as the current evidence does not explicitly support the idea that 
complex GVCs have been hit the hardest during the pandemic (OECD, 2020; Miroudot, 
2020, Verbeke, 2020). As such some economists think that there could be little significant 
change in GVCs and that adjustments will concentrate more in health-related industries as the 
economic rationale for most GVCs still holds.  
How do lead firms build resilience in GVCs? 
What lead firms do after Covid-19 will largely be influenced by the “impetus to change,” such as 
economic and political pressures, and “the ease of adjustment,” such as the difficulty of replacing 
certain suppliers and the capital costs associated with moving to new locations (Aylor et al., 
2020). The result will be different per sector and firm, for example decisions on asset-light 
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models of investment and automation-driven reshoring. The literature is clear that resilience 
building and increased digitalisation are the two main urgencies for GVCs in a post-Covid-
19 scenario. Resilience to bounce back quickly after the disruption and digitalisation as a tool to 
continue transactions and operations during lockdown periods. However, in complex supply 
networks with thousands of suppliers involved (e.g. automotive industry), diversifying suppliers to 
increase resilience involves considerable ongoing costs.  
The design of a resilient GVC requires four principles as the supply chain management 
literature refers to as ECAC: engineering, collaboration, agility, and culture (Lopes de Sousa 
Jabbour et al., 2020, p.n/a). Aylor et al. (2020) introduce three levers to improve resilience in 
GVCs by separating source (supplier ecosystem), make (manufacturing network), and 
deliver (channels and consumers) levers in the chain. For each lever, different strategies can 
be applied by different firms in different sectors. As a result, Aylor et al. (2020) modelled three 
adaptation strategies for firms in GVCs: revised global supply chains, migrated global supply 
chains (often referred to as China+1 strategy), and regionalised supply chains. 
Relocation is not an option for all companies. The challenge of lead firms after Covid-19 lies 
in a combination of how modern supply networks are structured and how lead firms 
choose to engage with their suppliers. In general, the literature seems to agree that many 
foreign companies are expected to continue with a China +1 strategy, while China is expected to 
remain the main manufacturing centre in the near term, with trends towards diversifying global 
industrial capacity set to continue over a longer period. Supporting existing suppliers is 
another critical way to create resilient production networks, as multinationals increasingly 
recognise that suppliers are their intricately linked partners and trusted long-term 
relationships often result in quick recovery after a crisis. 
Call for inclusive GVCs 
There is also a call to strengthen lead firm-SME linkages as Covid-19 has shown that risks 
are disproportionately channelled to SMEs and costs have been pushed down the GVC to 
the smaller entities. A Baker McKenzie (2020) report mentions that they expect supply-chain 
risk management to be extended at the lead firm level by including lower-tier suppliers, which 
goes beyond the pre-Covid-19 principle of only focussing on the top-tier suppliers. However, 
limited evidence could be found in the literature on how Covid-19 has disrupted lead firm-
SME linkages in GVCs. 
The literature mentions that progress towards more inclusive value chains could be 
undermined due to fragile lead firm-SME linkages. The ITC (2020) report mentions several 
solutions beyond investments in strengthening the resilience of small-scale suppliers that could 
strengthen the links that these firms have within supply chains: a) better contracts with SME 
suppliers can facilitate the sharing of risks, b) lead firms should redesign their approach to 
collaboration and costing with SME suppliers to ensure more equally shared value, and c) the 
way that the supply chain is managed and developed over time can foster an agile work culture 
that improves the capacity to adapt.  
Green solutions will change GVCs 
The literature also mentions the opportunity of developing more sustainable (greener) GVCs in a 
post-Covid-19 world. For GVC firms in middle-income countries this means that the need to 
invest in the enabling capacities to comply with environmental standards and regulations 
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(Blyde, 2020). Furthermore, the literature highlights the importance of digitalisation as a tool to 
establish sustainable GVCs driven by green logistics. Both (increased environmental 
standards and digitalisation) could be an extra burden for SMEs to participate in GVCs. 
Kenner (2020) also mentions that targeted decarbonisation policies and interventions could make 
production closer to the market more attractive for some sectors. Although this could reduce the 
carbon footprint of specific GVC, the potential impacts (positive and negative) on emerging 
economies is not clear yet as empirical evidence is scarce.  
The case study in this report on electric vehicles shows that greener solutions could 
change dramatically GVCs. The Deloitte (2020) report estimates that a third of all new cars sold 
globally will be electric by the end of this decade as petrol and diesel vehicles “likely reached 
their sales peak” during the pandemic. As the growth market will become electronic vehicles, this 
means that current supply chains will change as electric vehicles need far less different parts and 
main parts will be re-usable and recyclable. New actors such as software firms will enter the 
automotive GVC, creating threats and opportunities for middle-income countries, such as Brazil 
(Masiero et al., 2017). The case study also shows that governments in emerging 
economies use incentives to stimulate market opportunities for domestic firms to enter 
electric vehicle GVCs (e.g. Indonesia). 
How to support resilient GVCs 
This review shows how important government support (but also from business support 
organisations) is to increase resilience in GVCs and to anticipate to new opportunities 
(e.g. e-commerce and electronical vehicles). Support should be channelled mainly to SMEs to 
enable them to participate in GVCs and to lead firms to enable them to link with SMEs. As such 
the literature does not predict a dramatic shift in GVC support programmes, only an 
emphasis on digitalisation and resilience building.  
The way forward is to distinguish short-term (crisis), medium term (recovery) and long-
term (new normal) interventions to support firms to build resilient GVCs (OECD, 2020). 
Governments can do this by maintaining an open trade and investment environment, address 
financial and other issues of firms that participate in GVCs, promote standards and certification 
procedures including risk awareness, develop stress tests for critical supply chains and include 
criteria for robustness of supply chains in government procurement procedures, and promote e-
commerce and support programmes for SMEs, among others (OECD, 2020)       
The literature is clear that reshoring incentives (e.g. fiscal incentives, relax labour or 
environmental standards to compensate for additional costs), should not be promoted 
and only in a transparent way as there is no evidence that it increases the resilience of GVCs to 
tackle the issues related to this pandemic or other future crises.  
 Increasing complexity of GVCs 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) are characterised in the literature as linked activities 
undertaken by firms in different countries (Donovan et al., 2015; Kano et al., 2020; Strange et 
al., 2020). Although small firms could dominate GVCs, most GVCs involve large international 
corporations. As such, multinational enterprises are an important driver of GVC development, 
and they account for two-thirds of international trade (Meyer et al., 2020, p.n/a). Depending on 
the firm’s strategy, the degree of integration within the GVC varies between firms and sectors. 
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Even highly integrated corporations still need to buy inputs and rely on independent distributors 
(Strange, 2020).  
Kano et al. (2020, p.578) mention that the role of multinational enterprises in GVCs has 
shifted away from hierarchical entities, with their traditional focus on managing 
internalised overseas investments, to corporations as international lead firms. “These 
firms work with and integrate their geographically dispersed strategic partners, specialized 
suppliers, and customer bases into complex structures…” (ibid, p.578). This means that 
international corporations may remain in control of GVCs. However, activities are less likely to be 
internalised which has increased dependencies between multiple actors, including the rise of 
domestic corporations and linkages with Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in 
emerging economies (Yeung, 2016). The expansion of GVCs over the past decades has 
reshaped the geography of world trade and has allowed some Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries (LMICs), particularly in Southeast and East Asia, to engage in the production of more 
complex manufactured goods by specialising in distinct activities in GVCs (Meyer et al., 2020; 
Yeung, 2016).  
The rise of complex GVCs is the result of fragmentation and dispersion of business activities 
across the globe due to enabling technologies, regulative forces, increasing attention on core 
competencies, and growing externalisation of business activities (Kano et al., 2020). Therefore, 
the literature also speaks about supply networks instead of supply chains. Strange (2020, p.459) 
lists the following benefits of GVCs above domestic ones: 
• Cost advantages: In particular, for advanced economies, inputs of intermediate goods 
and services from abroad may be cheaper (e.g. labour costs) than similar inputs sourced 
from the domestic economy.  
• Limited productive capacity: There may not be enough productive capacity in the 
domestic economy to provide the necessary inputs in sufficient quantity, or inputs of the 
requisite quality.  
• Increased resilience: Diversified global sourcing could reduce s firms’ unsystematic 
risks and provides them with greater resilience to supply chain disruptions.  
• Choice: Consumers value the greater choice offered by the availability of final goods that 
include products from foreign sources. 
Although there are extra costs related to GVCs compared to domestic value chains in terms of 
higher transportation costs, extended delivery times, and greater complexity, the potential 
benefits of GVCs have outweighed the costs in the last decades (Strange, 2020, p.460). To 
maintain these benefits, GVCs rely on the relatively free movement of goods and services, and of 
people and capital worldwide. In particular, “most tangible goods” need to be physically delivered 
from one location to another and, as such, involve the movement of people across national 
borders (ibid, p.460). 
 Covid-19 and Global Value Chains 
Disruptions in GVCs during the Covid-19 pandemic  
Covid-19 started in the Chinese Hubei province, in the capital Wuhan. After strict lockdown rules 
were established to contain the spread of the virus, many Chinese manufacturers with linkages 
within GVCs had to suspend production or reduce their production capacity. For example, 
Wuhan is central in manufacturing parts for the automotive sector; as a result, the lockdown 
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disrupted the production of cars all over the world due to reliance on lean GVCs (Meester & 
Ooijens, 2020). The literature mentions several reasons why the Covid-19 pandemic could 
disrupt GVCs so badly. Most of the reasons relate to the complex set-up of GVCs as 
mentioned in Chapter 1:  
• As the virus has been detected in most countries around the world, the resilience benefit 
of diversifying global sourcing has weakened.  
• The pandemic has interrupted the international movements of people, capital, goods, and 
services (e.g. through physical distancing and lockdown measures).  
• The greater the distances involved and the more borders that need to be crossed, the 
more transaction costs have increased due to the disruptive effects of Covid-19.  
The impact varies per industry. For example, the food sector was less disrupted as demand 
remained,1 while other sectors were hit hardest (e.g. aviation, hotels, restaurants). The OECD 
(2020, p.6) mentions the example of the IT and electronics value chain, that although being 
highly complex and long, like the automotive sector, it did not suffer as much. Although Apple 
has delayed the launch of a new iPhone during the crisis, the device is now successfully sold 
mostly on-line. The production of four other iPhone models was also delayed by one month. Its 
main competitor, Samsung, reported not having any meaningful production disruptions (OECD, 
2020). However, larger firms shifted parts of the production to suppliers in countries with less 
Covid-19 cases, such as Vietnam.2 As a result, individual suppliers lower in the value chain in 
specific countries were impacted (Bytesnap, 2020). 
The literature shows that, in general, businesses resuming normal operations still face 
higher costs (at least in the short-term) at ports, as well as when handling their produce 
and inputs by air, rail and road (Meyer et al., 2020; Rincón Aznar et al. 2020). For example, for 
deliveries of car parts to Europe, the USA, and South America, which are usually made by sea, 
many East Asian suppliers have switched to more expensive air freight to meet delivery 
deadlines (Petkov, 2020). More detailed evidence on the impact of Covid-19 on global logistics 
can be read in the IFC (2020) report. 
The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on GVCs can be distinguished between supply-side 
and demand-side impacts, which also need to be differentiated for short-term and medium to 
longer-term implications on GVCs; Figure 1 illustrates the impact of Covid-19 on GVCs. The 
OECD (2020) report adds “direct impacts” (due to staff sickness and social distancing) and “trade 
and investment impacts” (due to policy restrictions). 
 
 
 
 
1 This does not mean that food supply chains were not interrupted. Studies have shown the impact of Covid-19 on food 
systems and hence on food security. See: Reardon et al. (2020). 
2 This news source mentions the example of Google and Microsoft who have shifted production from China to Vietnam. 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Google-Microsoft-shift-production-from-China-faster-due-to-virus (accessed 
September 2020). 
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Figure 1. Overview of different impacts of Covid-19 on GVCs  
 
Source: Meester & Ooijens, 2020, p.3, reproduced with permission from Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael’. 
On the demand-side impacts, Strange (2020) and Meester and Ooijens (2020) mention the 
following impacts:  
• As countries implement lockdowns and firms must shut-down, demand from both 
consumers and businesses slumps for the duration of the lockdown. Changes in 
consumer and firm purchasing behaviour will require adaptations to production and 
distribution networks, and as these adaptations take time to come into effect there is a 
risk of shortages and/or overproduction. For example, companies can decide to sell 
stocks rather than newly produced products (Strange, 2020; Meester & Ooijens, 2020).  
• In the medium to longer-term reduced consumer expenditure, consumer 
confidence, and the wider economic slowdown make it more difficult to return to 
pre-Covid-19 demand levels. Lower demand in virus-affected states across the world 
will be transferred down the value chain, affecting demand and production levels at each 
stage, even in areas not directly affected by the virus (Strange, 2020; Meester & Ooijens, 
2020).  
• Demand impacts are likely to vary strongly across sectors (e.g. demand for 
agricultural products is likely to fall less than demand for seasonal garments) and the 
number of employees affected is also strongly mediated by the degree of labour-
intensive stages in the production process (Strange, 2020). For example, garments and 
mining may both be heavily affected, but the garment sector is far more labour-intensive, 
aggravating the impact on employees (e.g. Van Teijlingen & Hogenboom, 2020; Dekker, 
2020). 
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On the supply-side impacts, Strange (2020) and Meester and Ooijens (2020) mention the 
following impacts:  
• The main short-term interruption in the operations of firms within GVCs is that 
employees are restricted from accessing and/or travelling to their workplaces, 
limitations due to physical distancing rules, and the risk of Covid-19 for employees’ 
health. Alternatively, when enterprises decide or must continue their operations, 
employees’ health may be severely impacted (Strange, 2020; Meester & Ooijens, 2020).  
• Assets’ operations may also be affected due to logistical constraints as well as 
constraints in suppliers’ production and reliability. For example, air cargo corridors have 
been disrupted and port handling takes more time (Strange, 2020; Meester & Ooijens, 
2020).  
• There are indirect effects on suppliers of intermediate goods and services, as 
buyers cancel orders and/or extend their payment periods. Such effects are larger 
when the buyers are large firms who can exploit the power asymmetries in their GVCs. 
As such, supply shocks are likely to fall disproportionately on SMEs and their employees, 
and on self-employed people: these groups typically have limited cash reserves. 
Although some exceptions exist in some sectors (e.g. e-commerce firms, delivery firms) 
most sectors are affected (Meester & Ooijens, 2020).  
• The medium-term and longer-term impacts on the supply-side development in 
GVCs, depend heavily on how rapidly demand can bounce-back and the flexibility of 
firms to adapt to the “new situation” of continued constraints and uncertainties (Strange, 
2020; Meester & Ooijens, 2020). 
Often the supply- and demand-side effects are interrelated, disrupting the operations within 
GVCs. Meester and Ooijens (2020, p.4) mention how both supply- and demand-side impacts 
affect the cooperation between value chain partners: 
• Transparency: GVCs’ transparency may function as an amplifier of any demand 
changes. Particularly, visibility on demand fluctuations reduces the further up the value 
chain one goes. As demand changes occur rapidly this affects producers far removed 
from the end-consumer the most, also called the “bullwhip effect”, leading to heavy costs 
to absorb the mismatch (Meester & Ooijens, 2020, p.4).  
• Flexibility: Even highly transparent GVCs struggle when firms are not sufficiently flexible 
or able to adjust to signs of reduced demand. Long value chains involving steps with long 
cycle times, low inventories and significant vertical integration may especially face 
difficulties in adjusting when demand falls or individual links stop working, as individual 
producers have made significant upfront investments or may face difficulties in 
cooperating with new partners (Meester & Ooijens, 2020, p.4). 
• Bottlenecks: Some GVCs may rely on specific locations or providers for specific critical 
goods or services, creating vulnerable bottlenecks. A clear example mentioned by 
Meester and Ooijens (2020) can be found in the automotive industry, which was heavily 
affected by the initial outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan as a number of manufacturers 
sourced critical components from the affected area. 
While these impacts eventually affect all producers in the value chain, the financial 
burden is unlikely to be shared equally across the chain. Protecting own cash position to 
ensure continuity in the short term will likely come at the expense of chain partners to a 
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considerable degree (Strange, 2020; Meester & Ooijens, 2020). The bargaining power of 
different producers in the chain is key in determining which chain partners will manage to avoid 
such costs. Furthermore, Meester and Ooijens (2020, p.4) mention some decision-making 
initiatives that could trigger power bargaining between different actors in the value chain: 
financial health, cost reduction, de-risking efforts, and uniqueness versus cost.3 
The literature on the indirect impacts of Covid-19 often refers to the disruption for jobs and 
livelihoods in both the formal and informal economy (ILO, 2020; Djankov & Panizza, 2020). 
Disruptions in GVCs are one of the contributions to such impacts, affecting groups differently, 
such as women workers, migrant workers, and/or informal sector workers, who often play a vital 
role in GVCs. The scope of this rapid review does not include these impacts as it focusses 
on how Covid-19 affects the operational and coordination aspects of GVCs.   
Measuring the impact on GVCs 
Lin and Lanng (2020, p.n/a) show that China’s domestic and international trade 
transactions suffered a week-on-week drop of 56% beginning mid-February. The United 
States, United Kingdom, and Europe followed suit, with a combined initial drop of 26% in the 
beginning of April, and a continuing decline of 17% in late April (Lin & Lanng, 2020). Less trade 
is one aspect of how Covid-19 has affected GDP growth in countries worldwide. Emerging 
data from Q2 shows that major emerging economies suffered large GDP reductions in 
comparison with the Q1: -23.9% in India (the largest quarterly contraction on record),4 -17.3% in 
Mexico,5 -16.5% in the Philippines,6 -5.3% in Indonesia,7 -51% in South Africa, and -9.7% in 
Brazil.8 
Strange (2020, p.460) mention that Covid-19 has mostly disrupted sectors in which 
economies lack domestic productive capacity, depending more on GVCs. Also, domestic 
industries that are highly integrated within GVCs have been disrupted, however, this depends on 
the sectors. A study by UNIDO Thailand and United Nations Thailand (2020) illustrates this for 
the automotive sector in the country. Covid-19 measures had the strongest negative impact 
 
3 For example, in Indonesia, workers in mining, garment and palm oil production are pressured to continue business as usual to 
maintain the country’s position in the value chain and limit the economic impact of the crisis (Dekker, 2020). This has led to 
health risks and concerns about forced labour and has highlighted a lack of state protection for its own citizens. This 
undermines efforts in ethical sourcing and transparency and exacerbating patterns of inequality and marginalisation in several 
countries (Van Teijlingen & Hogenboom, 2020; Meester et al., 2020). 
4 Source: https://fortune.com/2020/09/01/india-economy-gdp-q2-2020-
covid/#:~:text=India's%20gross%20domestic%20product%20shrank,the%20world's%20top%20five%20economies (accessed 
September 2020). 
5 Source: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
07/31/c_139252816.htm#:~:text=MEXICO%20CITY%2C%20July%2030%20(Xinhua,(INEGI)%20said%20on%20Thursday 
(accessed September 2020). 
6 Source: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/06/c_139269367.htm#:~:text=Home-
,Philippines'%20GDP%20growth%20rate%20drops%2016.5,Q2%202020%2C%20lowest%20since%201981&text=MANILA%2
C%20Aug.,country%20to%20a%20technical%20recession (accessed September 2020). 
7 Source: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/05/indonesias-gdp-contracts-deeper-than-expected-at-5-32-in-q2.html 
(accessed September 2020). 
8 Source: https://brazilian.report/coronavirus-brazil-live-blog/2020/09/01/q2-gdp-results-place-brazilian-economy-in-recession-
again/ (accessed September 2020). 
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on the automotive sector as indicated by the drop of manufacturing performance index in 
April 2020, about 82% year on year, showing the lowest production since 1987. However, 
the same report also mentions that the electronics sector was far less disrupted. As such, due to 
the interdependence in some GVCs, even countries that have been less affected by health 
impacts, still saw economic activities slowing down significantly due to the inter-connectivity of 
their economies with the wider world.  
Most recent resources that quantify the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on GVCs are based 
on mathematical simulation models (Queiroz et al., 2020). See here some of the findings from 
such studies:  
• Bonadio et al. (2020) showed that the GVCs are responsible for a sizeable minority 
of the overall GDP contraction. The mean contribution of foreign shocks to the fall in 
GDP is about one-third of the total, which means that an average country would 
experience an 11% GDP contraction purely due to the foreign lockdowns. The 
economies with the largest foreign shock contributions (in proportional terms) are 
among those most tightly integrated into the global supply chains: Brunei, 
Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Chile, and Colombia. Among these five countries, foreign 
shocks account for 57% of the total contraction on average.  
• Guan et al. (2020) found with their model that global supply-chain losses that are 
related to initial Covid-19 lockdowns are largely dependent on the number of 
countries imposing restrictions and that losses are more sensitive to the duration 
of a lockdown than its strictness. If only China had been affected, the results suggest 
that the GVCs effects (measured by value-added) would have been 3.5% of GDP, while 
the spread and containment measures in high-income countries in Europe and the United 
States could result in 12.6% fall in GDP. Another insight from the model is that even 
countries that are not directly affected by the virus experience large losses propagated by 
GVCs, and LMICs are more vulnerable to indirect effects. Specific country sectors are 
most vulnerable to such impacts, even in scenarios in which Covid-19 does not spread 
globally. Examples are electronics (e.g. China9), automotive (e.g. Germany10), catering, 
and tourism sectors.  
• Ivanov’s (2020a) simulation model shows that the timing of the closing and opening of 
the facilities at different degrees might become a major factor that determines the 
impact of the outbreak on GVCs’ performance rather than an upstream disruption 
duration or the speed of epidemic propagation. The lowest decrease in GVCs 
performance can be observed in cases when the facility recovery at different positions in 
 
9 In the scenario of a global spread and 6 months disruptions through lockdown measures, the recovery of China’s labour 
supply and transportation capacity to pre-Covid-19 levels does not prevent ongoing impacts to its electronics sector through 
GVCs, which are largely forward effects from upstream Asian countries, which result in a reduction in the sector’s output of 
32.8%. In this global scenario, downstream consumption in countries such as the United States, Japan, Mexico, and France is 
reduced by a total of 40% (Guan et al., 2020). 
10 Guan et al. (2020) measured for the scenario of a spread of Covid-19 only from China to high-income countries in Europe 
and the United States, would result in labour and transportation constraints in Germany and many of the countries that supply 
auto parts and raw materials, causing a decrease in production by the German automotive sector of 28.8%. Such decreases in 
German production ripple upstream to suppliers in Hungary, Spain, Italy and the United States, and downstream demand for 
German cars decreases in the United States, China and Austria by 29.1%, 37.6% and 22.3%, respectively. In the case of 
global spread and more widespread and longer-term lockdowns, the output of the German automobile industries decreases by 
a further 0.9%, mainly through disrupted supplies from LMICs to Germany (Guan et al., 2020). 
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the supply chain is synchronised in time. The most negative impact on the supply 
chain performance is observed in the cases with very long facility and demand 
disruption durations downstream the chain regardless of the disruption period in the 
upstream part. Ivanov (2020a) concludes that as such it is not only important to consider 
where the outbreak starts, and even not so important what percentage of supply base is 
located in the origin region but it is the scale of the “ripple effect” that should be 
particularly taken into account.  
• Holland and Liadze (2020) studies the extent to which international trade linkages can 
amplify a common domestic shock. They conclude that global spill-overs through 
trade linkages (e.g. through GVCs) could amplify the magnitude of domestic 
shocks by 60% on average. In other words, if all countries around the world suffered a 
1% domestic shock, the global economy would be expected to contract by 1.6% after 
accounting for spill-overs. For some of the smaller, very open economies, the spill-over 
effects from the rest of the world could even dominate the impact of the domestic shock 
on their own. 
• Inoue and Todo (2020) quantified the economic effect of a possible lockdown of Tokyo to 
prevent the spread of Covid-19 by looking at the negative effect such lockdown may 
propagate to other regions through supply chains. Although not based on GVCs but 
domestic supply chains, the model’s outcomes are interesting and show that when 
Tokyo is locked down for a month, the indirect effect on other regions in the 
country would be twice as large as the direct effect on Tokyo, leading to a total 
production loss of 27 trillion yen in Japan, or 5.3% of its annual GDP. Although the 
production shut down in Tokyo accounts for 21% of the total production in Japan, the 
lockdown would result in a reduction of the daily production in Japan by 86% in a month. 
Overall, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown the importance of a better understanding of 
GVCs in relation to epidemic outbreaks. Queiroz et al. (2020) and Ivanov (2020a) conclude 
that the topic has still to be adequately investigated, and very much is still unknown. Queiroz et 
al. (2020) did a systematic literature review of academic resources on the topic, although not 
exclusively global value chains. The analysis of the 32 selected studies shows that resource 
management is a great preoccupation: logistics and supply chains play an essential role in 
coordinating and integrating the multiple members’ activities, including manufacturers, 
transportation, government, etc. (Queiroz et al., 2020, p.n/a).  
 Reframing GVCs after Covid-19 
Will GVCs change?  
Covid-19 has exposed the vulnerabilities of interconnected and interdependent GVCs, 
having triggered a profound debate about the future of GVCs. However, even before the 
pandemic, GVCs were altered due to a shift in the political discourse towards forms of 
protectionism (e.g. US-China trade war), technological changes (e.g. big data, digitalisation, 
blockchain), and the urge for more inclusive and sustainable GVCs (e.g. climate change, 
inequalities).11 As such, some firms already moved production and sourcing closer to the end-
 
11 These pre-Covid-19 trends in GVCs were discussed in e.g. Sivarajah et al., 2017; Yasmin et al., 2020; Schniederjans et al., 
2020; Kurpjuweit et al., 2019; Clarke & Boersma, 2017. 
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users, changing the governance and structure of GVCs even before the Covid-19 pandemic 
occurred. This trend is visible in statistics: since 2011, the expansion of GVCs has stopped 
(OECD, 2020, p.3).  
Some scholars believe that the combination of trade-policy shocks and Covid-19 could 
irreversibly accelerate the transformation of GVCs (Javorcik, 2020; Lin & Lanng, 2020). 
Mainly, the Covid-19 pandemic is referred to as a wake-up call for a new balance between risk 
and reward for GVCs, as pandemics, climate change, natural disasters, protectionism, and 
manmade crises could result in frequent major disruptions. Javorcik (2020, p.112) for example 
mentions that many countries are only now discovering how dependent they are on supplies 
coming from China, e.g. almost three-quarters of blood thinners imported by Italy come from 
China, and 60% of antibiotic components imported by Japan and 40% imported by Germany, 
Italy, and France come from China. This realisation has led to calls urging more self-reliance and 
reshoring, creating new opportunities for countries that were not previously on the radar to 
participate in GVCs (Javorcik, 2020).12 Cordon and Buatois (2020) and Kenner (2020) foresee 
more regionalisation (reshoring/near-shoring), in particular for strategic sectors (e.g. 
pharmaceutics) indeed, while Lin and Lanng (2020) mention that manufacturing hubs such as 
Vietnam, Mexico, and India are likely to benefit from the shift away from China.  
There is also some reservation amongst scholars to rush into conclusions as the current 
evidence does not explicitly support the idea that complex GVCs have been hit the 
hardest during the pandemic (OECD, 2020; Miroudot, 2020, Verbeke, 2020). According to 
Miroudot (2020, p.121), the most impacted industries are those relying on the movement of 
people or passenger transport. And for countries under lockdown, the bulk of the impact is 
through the fall in domestic demand hurting domestic and GVCs (Miroudot, 2020; Bonadio et al., 
2020). Analytical work indicates that the contraction of GDP would have been worse with re-
nationalised GVCs, as government lockdowns also affect the supply of domestic inputs (Bonadio 
et al., 2020). As such some economists think that there could be little significant change in GVCs 
and that adjustments will concentrate more in health-related industries as the economic rationale 
for most GVCs still holds.  
Such findings let Verbeke (2020, p.445) to conclude that: 
“[T]here will undoubtedly be long‐term impacts on established IB [international business] 
managerial practices, such as human resources management. The main guiding 
principles of GVC design, however, are less likely to change: the GVC governance 
system came into existence because it was better suited to serve economic efficiency 
and to create economic value than other types of governance”. 
Kenner (2020) and Freund et al. (2020) show that reshoring cannot be the full answer 
because large markets like the EU and US need a functioning global trading system. For 
example, the EU accounts for 15% of global exports and about the same share of global imports. 
Kenner (2020, p.n/a): “It is an awkward ideological leap to expect to participate in this system as 
an exporter, while also systematically looking to reduce your reliance on imports. In essence, if 
 
12 Javorcik (2020, p.114) mentions that many countries in Eastern Europe and eastern and southern Mediterranean have a 
comparative advantage in products now exported by China. To seize this opportunity to enter or to intensify participation in 
global value chains, countries will need to step up their investment promotion efforts. Javorcik (2020, p.114): “They will need to 
inform potential investors about business opportunities on offer, showcase their commitment to maintaining a good business 
climate, and signal their welcoming attitude to foreign direct investment.”  
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the EU wants to be a seller, it has to be a buyer as well”. As such, reshoring or near-shoring 
should not be the result of increased protectionism (although both could be related), because 
reshoring will not automatically deliver resilience nor more robust GVCs (Leering et al., 2020). 
Furthermore, reshoring will most likely go hand in hand with automation to reduce costs, not 
resulting in major job creation. Freund et al. (2020) show that in previous shocks, like the 2011 
Japan earthquake, affected firms worldwide did not react with reshoring. However, there is 
evidence that they were increasingly engaged in strategies to build linkages with other 
suppliers with the same competitive advantages as the Japanese firms, particularly in 
LMICs. No evidence was found that supply chain diversification was increasingly regionalised 
(Freund et al., 2020). 
Leering et al. (2020) refer to the automotive sector and do not expect that significant changes in 
the GVC will happen due to Covid-19. With thousands of suppliers involved in a vehicle’s 
supply network, diversifying suppliers to increase resilience involves considerable 
ongoing costs, they argue. Even if they are only used as backups, suppliers need to be able to 
produce to detailed specifications and meet quality and safety standards at any time. Holding 
more inventory also involves higher costs for working capital and storage costs, especially 
considering the bulkiness of many of the parts. Interestingly, Leering et al. (2020) also mention 
that the shift to electric vehicles will deliver a transformation in supply chains in the 
automotive industry, which offers opportunities for building resilience. Electric vehicles 
have fewer parts than vehicles with traditional engines, so as the share of electric vehicles in 
total sales increases during this decade, the number of suppliers will go down (see more in 
Chapter 7). 
 
See: Figure 2. What GVCs are more prone to change than others (Aylor et al., 2020, p.3), 
https://web-assets.bcg.com/8d/6f/993b0da4424dac2931263f02df1c/bcg-designing-resilience-
into-global-supply-chains-july-2020.pdf  
 
Which sectors (and firms) adapt better to change than others, depends on two factors, according 
to Aylor et al. (2020): company decisions will largely be influenced by the “impetus to 
change,” such as economic and political pressures, and “the ease of adjustment,” such 
as the difficulty of replacing certain suppliers and the capital costs associated with 
moving to new locations (Figure 2). The impetus to change has become prevalent in recent 
years and could increase even further due to Covid-19. Qiang et al. (2020) mention the example 
of the USA and Japan. In the USA the government is working on proposals to push American 
companies to move operations or key suppliers out of China by offering tax breaks, while the 
Japanese government agreed on a US$2.2 billion support package to subsidise manufacturers 
that move their production out of China (Qiang et al., 2020).13  
The literature is clear that resilience building and increased digitalisation are the two main 
urgencies for GVCs in a post-Covid-19 scenario. Resilience to bounce back quickly after the 
disruption and digitalisation as a tool to continue transactions and operations during lockdown 
periods. Ivanov (2020b, p.n/a) shows that the research angle of the management of global 
 
13 The consumer products maker Iris Ohyama is the first in line to take advantage of this subsidy (Qiang et al., 2020). 
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supply chains has already increased the scope over time away from “leagility” with a focus on 
responsiveness in the 1990s, towards “resilience” with a focus on natural and manmade 
disasters since 2005, “sustainability” triggered by climate change after 2010, and “digitalisation” 
with a focus on data analysis since 2015. Understanding GVCs during and after the Covid-19 
pandemic requires analysis and integration of all these research angles (Ivanov, 2020b). 
The next sections will look first at the meaning of “resilience” and “viability” regarding GVCs. In 
the current debate, most attention goes to understand if resilience measures have worked during 
the pandemic and how they could be improved as a reaction to ever more efficient (but less 
flexible) lean and just-in-time GVC systems. Ivanov’s (2020b) study adds to this discussion the 
principle of “viability”. Cross-cutting for both resilient and viable GVCs is the role of “digital” 
solutions. Beyond resilience, viability, and digital, there is an increasing literature on the urge to 
make GVCs more sustainable (e.g. reaction to climate change) and inclusive (e.g. increasing 
participation of SMEs) after the pandemic. These topics will be examined in more details in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
Resilience 
In the discussion about resilience, a distinction is made between what reliance actually 
means and the difference with robustness. This is important because building robustness and 
resilience in GVCs requires different strategies (Miroudot, 2020). Robustness means “the ability 
to withstand a disruption (or a series of disruptions) to maintain the planned performance” where 
resilience means “the ability to withstand a disruption (or a series of disruptions) and recover the 
performance” (Ivanov, 2020b, p.n/a). As Miroudot (2020) explains, during the pandemic 
robustness matters mostly for medical supplies, while resilience matters for negatively affected 
industries (e.g. tourism).  
Miroudot (2020) further explains that since important costs are associated with robustness, such 
as investing in a diverse supply networks and tools that allow the monitoring of risks, many 
companies are not interested in cancelling out all risks in their supply chains at all cost; 
they accept the risk of major disruptions, but nevertheless invest in reducing the time needed for 
recovery, which is typically a resilience strategy. The OECD (2020, p.8) report mentions the 
following case of Cisco after the 2011 earthquake in Japan. The company hardly lost revenue 
while implementing the “Cisco lean model”. This means that the company had effectively 
integrated risk awareness at all levels in the value chain and put in place monitoring mechanism 
for resilience, with an index to assess the time to recover for all its suppliers. 
Resilience can be built in different ways:  
• Sourcing strategies may differ across activities depending on the level of acceptable 
risk, with supplier diversification and ‘just in case’ processes an objective for essential 
activities (OECD, 2020). 
• Through products (with buffer stocks and standardised inputs easier to be replaced) and 
the design of the value chain (identifying places and suppliers less subject to risk) 
(Miroudot, 2020, p.124).  
• Risk management strategies at the firm level are emphasising risk awareness and 
promoting agility, for example through resilience monitoring (assessing the time to 
recover for each type of supplier) (OECD, 2020; Miroudot, 2020, p.124). 
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As such agility is an essential pillar for resilience. The ITC (2020) report shows that a 
constructive reaction to risk is to take advantage of it. Agile firms change form in 
response to the current situation, show the ITC (2020) survey amongst firms. This may 
include customising or proposing new products or business models according to new market 
trends. Agile firms have created new products and services such as designer masks and rapid 
testing technologies during the pandemic to shift to products with high demand.  
The ITC survey (2020) also shows that during the lockdown, some firms lent their employees to 
other active businesses in essential industries. In their survey amongst SMEs, roughly 21% of 
the companies that responded adopted this strategy to deal with the pandemic. ITC (2020, p.39): 
“Here is where it is good to be small, because it’s easier for small firms to take swift decisions 
and develop new products quickly. What SMEs may lack in productivity; they gain in agility.” 
However, Miroudot (2020) emphasised in his conclusions two common misunderstandings in 
implementing resilience strategies: 
• The first mistake is to equate self-sufficiency or domestic production with robustness.  
• The second mistake is to focus on the location of production; the overriding imperative 
during a crisis is to maintain and scale up production. 
Leering et al. (2020) mention the example of the electronics sector, which is mainly concentrated 
in Southeast Asia. The complexity of electronics supply chains reduces the scope for 
diversifying suppliers because it is difficult for firms to evaluate dependencies across different 
tiers of the supply chain. Even if a firm successfully diversifies the suppliers of 90% of its inputs, 
disruption to any of the remaining 10% is still enough to shut down production (Leering et al., 
2020). Therefore, awareness of potential disruption in supply chain management in such 
complex GVCs should be based on resilience, instead of focussing on robustness. 
Hence, single sourcing and a long-term relationship with a single supplier is also a 
strategy often observed for improving supply-chain resilience. This strategy might not be 
optimal in terms of robustness when this supplier is affected by risk. However, there is empirical 
evidence that supplier diversification is associated with a slower recovery from supply 
disruptions, whereas the use of long-term relationships is associated with more rapid recovery 
(Jain et al. 2017). 
Viability 
According to Ivanov (2020b, p.n/a), resistance to disruption needs to be considered at “the scale 
of viability to avoid market collapses and secure the provision of goods and services”. Where 
resilience is based on building capabilities within a pre-set system to weather out disruptions, 
viability is much more related to the capability of being able to change the system over 
time to respond to disruptions without a time limit. Ivanov and Dolgui (2020, p.2907) refer to 
this as “a behaviour-driven property (continuous system change) of a system with structural 
dynamics” in an “open system context” that is “survival-oriented without fixed time windows in a 
long-term scale”. As such Ivanov (2020b, p.n/a) places viability as “the highest analysis level for 
supply chain reactions to disturbances”, which is based upon stability (the ability to return to a 
pre-disturbance state and ensure a continuity), robustness, resilience, and viability. According to 
Ivanov (2020b), viability is “the ability to maintain itself and survive in a changing environment 
over a long period of time through a redesign of the structures and re-planning of economic 
performance with long-term impacts”.  
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The Viability Supply Chain model that Ivanov (2020b) introduces (see Figure 3) relies on 
three cycles: an agility-oriented, resilience-oriented, and survival-oriented cycle. He also 
demonstrates how the components of the viability supply chain model can be categorised across 
organisational, informational, process-functional, technological, and financial structures which all 
include potential disruptions in the short- and long-term. 
See: Figure 3. Viable supply chain ecosystem framework (source: Ivanov, 2020b), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03640-6   
Technology and digitalisation are all important building stones of this model. Digital, data-
driven technologies can support the GVC decision-making in cases of long-term, severe 
disruptions such as epidemic outbreaks (Ivanov & Dolgui, 2020). Viability will encourage 
investments in flexible and adaptable production and distribution systems (e.g. omnichannel, 
additive and digital manufacturing) along with reactive, real-time mapping of supply and demand 
(Ivanov & Dolgui, 2020, p.2912). 
 Lead firms’ strategic decision-making on resilience 
The literature mentions that the recovery process would require a reassessment of the 
structure of a supply chain in terms of location, production capacity, and management of 
the flow of materials and information amongst the current actors of the supply chain in order 
to identify pros and cons and eventually to reconfigure the supply chain structure (Govindan et 
al., 2020). Kano et al. (2020, p.584) published a figure that shows decision-making processes 
and influences on GVCs’ outcomes such as firm-specific performance, upgrading, and chain 
level durability and stability (see Figure 4). These are structured around “structural governance” 
(control, location, network) and “strategic governance” (learning, the role of lead-firm, GVCs 
orchestration) measures, while influenced by macro-level influencers (e.g. economic 
development) and micro-level influencers (e.g. management capabilities). Although it is from pre-
Covid-19, Kano et al.’s (2020) conceptual model is useful to understand the strategic decision-
making processes of lead firms in GVCs and how this could be affected by the pandemic.  
 
See: Figure 4. A comparative institutional framework of GVC governance (source: Kano et al., 
2020, p.584), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-020-00304-2 
 
To understand management decisions for dealing with disruptions in supply chains, the 
three Ts are mentioned in the literature: time, transparency, and trust (Lopes de Sousa 
Jabbour et al., 2020, p.n/a). Time means focussing only on adding value processes that 
costumers are willing to pay for; transparency relates to the necessary levels of inventory and 
costs of production which are reliable and fair for the joint planning of production and sales; and 
trust is the consequence of collaborative working practices that enable the sharing of gains and 
losses (Wilding, 2003 – as cited in Lopes de Sousa Jabbour et al., 2020, p.n/a).  
Looking at how firms coped with previous major disruptions, shows the importance of 
having good management and governance systems in place. As Meyer et al. (2020, p.n/a) 
mentions, in 2003, during the SARS crisis, many Asian companies along GVCs increased 
production in response, built buffer levels and stocked up inventories. Many firms developed 
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business plans, establishing parallel sites or shifting operations, and invested in IT to enable 
remote working (Meyer et al., 2020). Now, because of advanced, activity‐based accounting and 
digital tools, as well as other managerial innovations in coordination and control (such as block 
chains), senior managers can identify and isolate very narrow, modular activity sets to be 
coordinated with each other (Verbeke, 2020). For each activity set, they decide on internalisation 
versus external production, and on its optimal location. They continuously reflect on what should 
be done inside the firm versus outside of it, and where. The outcome is, according to Verbeke 
(2020) that a GVC with great agility responds swiftly to exogenous shocks.  
The argument of Cordon and Buatois (2020) is that the GVC model that is only focussed 
on optimisation of minimum cost and volume stability has become irrelevant. Supply chain 
management has become the prime driver of company business, which according to Cordon and 
Buatois (2020) makes it feasible in a post-COVID-19 world to introduce supply chain stress tests, 
like financial stress tests became the norm after the financial crisis for financial institutions. As 
volumes become more variable, supply chains must become more adaptive, as actors in the 
value chain prepare for major catastrophic events. Technologies such as comprehensive 
dashboards that lay out the full status of production and shipment, down to the last detail and 
refresh every 20 minutes to provide a real-time overview of the entire supply chain will become 
the norm (Cordon & Buatois, 2020). 
The design of a resilient GVC requires four principles as the supply chain management 
literature refers to as ECAC: engineering, collaboration, agility, and culture (Lopes de Sousa 
Jabbour et al., 2020, p.n/a): 
• Supply chain engineering: Mapping the structure of a supply chain, covering all of its 
members, including first and second-tier suppliers, channels of distribution and final 
consumers, is important in order to identify likely bottlenecks that may restrict the flow, 
capacity and visibility of production. Lopes de Sousa Jabbour et al. (2020) mention that 
the use of “critical path and risk register tools” can help managers to perform the required 
map assessment of a supply chain.  
• Supply chain collaboration: Sharing information is the best way to increase visibility 
and reduce risks in a supply chain. The purpose of collaboration in a supply chain is to 
create a common understanding of the strategy of the supply chain. Therefore, sharing 
outputs from political, economic, social, and technological analysis (PEST forces) and 
risk assessment of demand, supply, and processes between actors of a supply chain 
creates a community perspective (Lopes de Sousa Jabbour et al., 2020).  
• Supply chain agility: Lopes de Sousa Jabbour et al. (2020) mention two ways for agility. 
Firstly, visibility is related to monitoring the flow of materials and information across a 
supply chain to ensure that procurement, production, delivery schedules and orders will 
be met. Secondly, velocity concerns reducing the “end-to-end” time taken for producing 
and delivering products and services need to be analysed. Digital technologies, such as 
cyber-physical systems, sensors, barcodes, internet of things, collaboration portals and 
cloud computing can enable both the visibility and the velocity of supply chains.  
• Supply chain risk management culture: Risk assessment management should be 
developed as part of the routine of a company and its supply chain to build an ability to 
anticipate and respond to disruptions. Leadership towards the creation of risk 
assessment teams would help firms to pursue this culture. Big data analytics and 
blockchain are means of gathering and recording information to be analysed (Lopes de 
Sousa Jabbour et al., 2020).  
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An ITC (2020) Covid-19 survey reveals that SMEs were far more likely to adopt agile 
responses to the crisis than larger firms. However, they were also slightly more inclined to 
adopt retreating strategies than bigger companies. It was mainly large businesses, for their part, 
that could adopt a resilient approach than SMEs, underscoring their greater capacity to ride out 
the storm. ITC (2020, p.39): “The take-away from this analysis is that while large companies can 
afford to stay put and be resilient, small companies must either adapt to the crisis in an agile 
manner or collapse”.  
However, this does not mean that larger (lead) firms are not adjusting to changes, only 
that their agility is part of the wider resilience strategy. As the architects of GVCs, lead firms 
constantly adapt to risks and opportunities by reconfiguring production networks and optimising 
supply chain complexity (Qiang et al., 2020). They strategise to improve not only efficiency, but 
also their resilience. Their strategies consider technological advancements, shifting consumer 
preferences and government policies. Therefore, Qiang et al. (2020) believe that Covid-19 will 
extend rather than reshape existing strategic thinking by lead firms, for example decisions on 
asset-light models of investment and automation-driven reshoring. 
Aylor et al. (2020) introduce three levers to improve resilience in GVCs by separating 
source (supplier ecosystem), make (manufacturing network), and deliver (channels and 
consumers) levers in the chain. For each lever, different strategies can be applied by different 
firms in different sectors. As a result, Aylor et al. (2020) modelled three adaptation strategies for 
firms in GVCs: revised global supply chains, migrated global supply chains (often referred to as 
China+1 strategy), and regionalised supply chains (see Figure 5 and 6). 
 
See: Figure 5. Levers of improving resilience across supply chains (source: Aylor et al., 2020, 
p.n/a)14, https://www.bcg.com/en-gb/publications/2020/resilience-in-global-supply-chains 
 
See: Figure 6. Three emerging models for adapting supply chains (source: Aylor et al., 2020, 
p.n/a)15, https://www.bcg.com/en-gb/publications/2020/resilience-in-global-supply-chains 
 
For example, Vietnam has absorbed much of the manufacturing capacity that China has 
lost. The country has signed several international trade deals and invested significantly in 
industrial infrastructure over the past decades, while labour costs are around 50% less than 
China (Oxford Business Group, 2020). Other countries are looking to capitalise on the shift away 
from China (even pre-Covid-19). For example, Indonesian government outlined in 2019 plans to 
develop more special economic zones to position the country as a leading destination for 
manufacturing firms looking to move out of China (Oxford Business Group, 2020). Firms that 
 
14 Accessed via Boston Consulting Group (BCG) website, https://www.bcg.com/en-gb/publications/2020/resilience-in-global-
supply-chains (accessed September 2020). 
15 Accessed via Boston Consulting Group (BCG) website, https://www.bcg.com/en-gb/publications/2020/resilience-in-global-
supply-chains (accessed September 2020). 
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might want to relocate some parts of the production closer to demand are looking to opportunities 
in Mexico (US-focused firms) and Northern Africa (European-focused firms).16 
However, relocation is not an option for all companies. Many business experts see the 
efficient Covid-19 responses in China as a pro. Another factor complicating any potential 
relocation is related to parts and raw material, with many countries still reliant on China for the 
components needed for production. Furthermore, once export-oriented manufacturers set up a 
base in China, they serve to stimulate local enterprise as SMEs integrate into their supply chains, 
which can enhance manufacturing self-sufficiency over time (Oxford Business Group, 2020).   
The key is that traditional supply chains have transitioned into supply networks. The challenge 
of lead firms after Covid-19 lies in a combination of how modern supply networks are 
structured and how lead firms choose to engage with their suppliers. The outcomes can be 
very different for countries, sectors, and specific firms due to strategic decision-making 
processes. In general, the literature seems to agree that many foreign companies are 
expected to continue with a China +1 strategy, while China is expected to remain the main 
manufacturing centre in the near term, with trends towards diversifying global industrial 
capacity set to continue over a longer period (Oxford Business Group, 2020; Qiang et al., 
2020; Kenner, 2020). As mentioned earlier, Jain et al. (2016) provided evidence that long-term 
relationships among companies are associated with a more rapid recovery from a crisis. 
Therefore, supporting suppliers is another critical way to create resilient production 
networks, as multinationals increasingly recognise that suppliers are their intricately 
linked partners (Qiang et al., 2020). Lead firms can accelerate payment for goods that have 
either been produced, or are in the process of being produced, as shown by global garment 
retailers, and by suppliers of Boeing airplanes. Multinationals can also help suppliers adapt their 
production process to a different market after COVID-19 (Qiang et al., 2020). For 
example, Apple is helping its partners redesign and reconfigure factory floorplans to maximise 
interpersonal space (Qiang et al., 2020).  
Finally, technological change and automation also play an important role in the decision-
making outcomes of firms. Multinationals can use artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
Big Data to monitor a producer’s entire supply network and can use ICT advances to remotely 
plan, develop and oversee production, connect to customers, and fulfil orders (Verbeke, 2020). 
For example, as Qiang et al. (2020) mention, Toyota has efficiently implemented this approach 
since the 2011 Japanese earthquake, allowing it to track components and replace them easily 
during COVID-19.  
As such, Verbeke (2020) foresees four new research areas related to areas where GVC 
decision-making could change due to Covid-19: a) increased investments in intelligence and 
contracting safeguards, b) reducing levels of irreversible investments abroad, c) improved 
relational contracting with key partners and ex-post governance, and d) increased levels of 
diversification. The extent and effectiveness in which companies can adapt to the vast 
 
16 In early May regional media reported that US tech giant Apple would produce around 30% of its AirPods – some 3m-4m units 
– for the second quarter in Vietnam rather than China (Oxford Business Group, 2020). Indian automotive manufacturing 
companies such as Tata Motors and Maruti, for example, are increasing local sourcing to reduce their dependence on China 
(Qiang et al., 2020). And Renault, for example, recently announced that it is withdrawing from its joint venture with Chinese 
state-owned automobile manufacturer Dongfeng (source: Reuters 14 April 2020 - https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-renault-m-a-
dongfeng/renault-quits-its-main-china-venture-after-weak-sales-idUKKCN21W0HB, accessed September 2020). 
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interruptions and shortages, and are able to re-organise production systems, will determine the 
impact on GVCs and their role in the world economy as we know it (Rincón-Aznar et al., 2020, 
p.R3). 
 Covid-19 and Lead firm-SME linkages 
A Baker McKenzie (2020) report mentions that they expect supply-chain risk management 
to be extended at the lead firm level by including lower-tier suppliers, which goes beyond 
the pre-Covid-19 principle of only focussing on the top-tier suppliers. Baker McKenzie 
(2020, p.10) acknowledge that lower-tier suppliers are “critically important to the overall supply-
chain hierarchy, and disruptions at these levels can quickly cause disturbances throughout the 
chain”. Many of these lower-tier firms are SMEs. SMEs are not always suppliers to lead firms. 
They can also have an essential role in the distribution network of products and services to local 
markets (e.g. through shop networks, home delivery services) or with horizontal linkages to 
larger production units (see Box 1).  
However, limited evidence could be found in the literature on how Covid-19 has disrupted 
lead firm-SME linkages in GVCs. Most information is anecdotal, mostly by looking at the 
available evidence (pre-pandemic) and predicting what the potential impact of Covid-19 
could be. A World Trade Organization (WTO, 2020) publication mentions that current disruptions 
disproportionately affect sectors in which MSMEs are highly integrated into GVCs. For example, 
in office equipment, electronics, chemicals, petroleum and plastic sectors, MSMEs import almost 
60% of total inputs from foreign countries (backward participation), while in the automotive and 
furniture sectors, MSMEs – especially foreign-owned MSMEs – export more than 40% of their 
total sales through direct or indirect trade channels (forward participation).  
As such, the WTO (2020, p.4) mention that MSMEs that participate in GVCs can be 
disproportionately at risk and progress towards more inclusive value chains “can be 
undermined”. Most MSMEs in LMICs were already excluded in GVCs for various reasons. 
The WTO (2020) mention that MSMEs' exports amount to only 7.6% of total sales in the 
manufacturing sector in LMICs. Reasons commonly invoked to explain the low participation of 
MSMEs in international trade include lack of relevant skills, lack of knowledge about international 
markets, and cumbersome regulations and border procedures, as well as limited access to trade 
finance. In particular, the MSME trade finance gap, which is estimated at about US$ 1.5 trillion 
per year by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as cited by WTO (2020, p.4), is a concern to 
increase given the negative effects of Covid-19 on financial market confidence. “This offers 
especially negative prospects for firms in [LMICs] where a lack of trade finance can severely 
hinder trade opportunities” (WTO, 2020, p.4). 
In general, the pre-Covid-19 literature on lead firm-SME linkages focuses mainly on 
vertical linkages and is dominated by theoretical and conceptual papers outlining the 
benefits (and disadvantages) for SMEs of linking with large businesses (Quak, 2019). Only 
a few empirical papers exist on the subject, mainly by gathering the data from the side of large 
firms. The conclusion of the literature is that SMEs can expect benefits from participating in 
GVCs, as they increase SME competitiveness through business linkages, enhance product 
quality due to technology transfer, and facilitate SME expansion to overseas marketplaces with 
job creation (Canare et al., 2017). Lead firms have an advantage as well to access new markets 
and distribution networks, to diversify supplies, and to improve their ethical and social 
responsibilities (Canare et al., 2017; Botelho & Bourguignon, 2011).  
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However, the literature also mentions some main constraints (WTO, 2020; Quak, 2019; World 
Bank, 2018): 
• Most international lead firms are rarely in a direct trading relationship with SMEs, 
particularly the smaller ones; the relationship is often mediated by one or more levels of 
trader and supplier. The question then arises of how international lead firms can support 
suppliers to trade with SMEs, and in doing so reconcile their inclusion with commercial 
drivers.  
• It is usually the smaller firm that bears a greater risk. These risks could be due to the 
difference in resources available to the small and large partner and to the development of 
trust and commitment. The latter relates to transparency differences in GVCs towards 
smaller firms in GVCs that are often upstream and lack information on strategic decisions 
from lead firms. 
• Limited access to technology restricts the ability of most micro- and small 
entrepreneurs and base-of-the-pyramid customers to pivot to e-commerce, which is 
an increasingly important factor for GVC involvement. SMEs risk losing out to large 
businesses with greater access to capital to invest in technology.  
There are also constraints from the side of lead firms, namely (Canare et al., 2017):  
• Being part of a business linkage programmes require internal commitments of many 
years involving significant resources, technology, and persistence.  
• Lead firms may have difficulty selecting potential SME partners without accurate 
information that can be used to evaluate their performance and reduce the risks of 
working with them.  
• A supportive enabling environment is a critical foundation for encouraging business 
linkages between lead firms and SMEs.17 
These constraints to engage in inclusive supply/trade linkages in GVCs show how fragile 
these linkages are for any major disruption, and therefore for the current pandemic. As 
such, it could be predicted that Lead firm-SME linkages that have been built over the past years 
could be severely disrupted due to the pandemic.18 e-Commerce and digitalisation of supply 
networks are indicated to become more important to maintain lead firm-SME linkages, risk and 
costs assessments are needed to maintain linkages, as are a supportive enabling environment. 
However, no empirical evidence for this could be found yet.    
A recent IFC report (Geaneotes & Mignano, 2020) mentions how inclusive businesses as 
lead firms in their sectors in emerging markets have adapted during the Covid-19 crisis to 
support their low-income and vulnerable suppliers, distributors, and customers. Some 
important lessons could be learned from this for other (international) lead firms to maintain 
inclusive value chains (Geaneotes & Mignano, 2020):  
 
17 For example, labour market rigidity, cross-country regulations, non-tariff barriers, inability to meet the quality and standards 
for certain products, managerial constraints and lack of access to credit make SMEs hesitant to step forward. However, most of 
these constraints can be eased by policy support and regulatory coordination. Source: Geaneotes & Mignano, 2020. 
18 Interpretation by the author after analysing the literature. 
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• Leverage existing tech-based information and payment channels: Many inclusive 
businesses use technology platforms to support and engage with micro and small 
enterprises in their supply and distribution chains. Inclusive businesses now leverage 
these platforms to distribute Covid-19 related health information and arrange payments.19 
This includes using financial technology to facilitate digital money transfers and payments 
by their customers, retailers, and distributors and, in some cases, waiving fees for online 
or telephone orders and financial transactions (Geaneotes & Mignano, 2020). 
• Adopt alternative distribution channels: As many retail outlets have closed due to the 
requirements for social distancing, inclusive businesses, like other businesses, are now 
ensuring continued access by offering their products and services online. To enable 
business-to-consumer deliveries, inclusive retailers are partnering with small 
transportation companies that deliver goods via motorcycle. Where consumers are not 
comfortable using e-commerce, or lack the necessary technology to do so, businesses 
have extended their services by taking orders and managing deliveries by telephone 
(Geaneotes & Mignano, 2020).  
• Adapt the product or service: To help the small farmers and micro-distributors/retailers 
in their value chains to continue operating; some inclusive businesses are modifying their 
product and service offerings. For example, they are processing products so that they 
have a longer shelf life, shifting their service from transporting people to transporting 
essential goods, and adjusting their technologies or products to utilise contactless 
approaches to paying for goods and services and making deliveries (Geaneotes & 
Mignano, 2020).20 
Box 1: The different linkages between SMEs and lead firms explained 
SME participation in GVCs and their link with lead firms can be distinguished between producing and exporting 
final products and intermediates. In contrast, others might not export but deliver products and services to 
domestic larger firms that are directly connected to GVCs. The following information was derived from the Ganne 
and Lundquist (2020) study:  
• Direct forward participation: Evidence from Southeast Asia reveals, that SME exports of intermediates in 
Thailand represent a bigger share of their overall exports than for large firms – 16% of SME exports are sold 
to firms abroad for further processing. In comparison, only 6% of large firms’ exports are processed further 
(López González, 2017 – as cited in Ganne & Lundquist, 2020). This finding reflects the opportunities that 
GVCs open for SMEs to integrate into the global economy by specialising in segments of production and 
supply of intermediates, rather than having to master the entire production process of finished products. 
Opportunities in this respect might be bigger in the services sector. In Vietnam for example, the share of 
SME exports used by other countries to produce other exports increases from 5% when only manufacturing 
 
19 For example, Cargill (a global commodity trader and processor) in partnership with FarmForce, a cloud-based mobile 
platform, is now deploying its digital farming application to disseminate COVID-19 information to over 1,200 cooperatives and 
lead farmers in Côte d’Ivoire. Olam International (a global agricultural supply chain integrator and commodity trader) is doing 
the same by using its online platform to send information and advice on Covid-19 to suppliers and arrange online payments. 
Source: Geaneotes & Mignano, 2020. 
20 For example, Dodla Dairy (a dairy company in India) that sources from cooperatives of small farmers began purchasing some 
of farmers’ excess milk and converting it into powder. This is creating continuity and stability in the dairy supply chain. In Sri 
Lanka, PickMe app with over 60% of its drivers operating motorised rickshaws, quickly shifted its services from ride-hailing to 
delivering essential goods such as groceries and liquid petroleum gas for cooking. Not only does this enable the company’s 
drivers to continue earning a living, PickMe is providing a much-needed service for consumers. The company has also 
established an emergency hotline for hospital staff who need transportation to get to and from work. Source: Geaneotes & 
Mignano, 2020. 
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is considered, to 26% when service firms are included (López González, 2017 – as cited in Ganne & 
Lundquist, 2020). As such this evidence provides an interesting new perspective on SME GVC participation 
in Southeast Asia.  
• Direct backward participation: Another way for SMEs to benefit from GVCs is through imports of 
intermediate goods (backward participation), which matters for competitiveness (Lopez-Gonzalez, 2016 and 
2017 – as cited in Ganne & Lundquist, 2020). It has been shown that firms that use more imported products 
are more productive as they can draw on cheaper and more sophisticated inputs as well as benefit from 
innovation and new technologies embodied in imports (Bas & Strauss-Kahn, 2014 and 2015 – as cited in 
Ganne & Lundquist, 2020). According to WTO estimates, GVC participation by SMEs in the manufacturing 
sector in LMICs is mainly driven by upstream links (backward participation), with SMEs importing inputs 
needed in their manufacturing process from abroad (Lanz et al., 2018; WTO, 2016 – as cited in Lundquist, 
2020).  
• Indirect participation in GVCs: Smaller firms often participate in GVCs indirectly by supplying 
intermediates to other local firms – domestic or foreign-owned – that export (indirect forward participation). 
Likewise, the fixed costs associated with direct importing may lead many SMEs to source inputs from local 
enterprises that use imported products (indirect backward participation). Evidence on indirect participation of 
SMEs in GVCs is scarce and difficult to collect due to lack of data on value-added at the firm level. Studies 
that analyse the role of SMEs as suppliers reveal that focusing only on direct exports significantly 
underestimates the role played by SMEs in GVCs. Indirect exports of SMEs are particularly significant in 
sectors where GVCs play an important role and where scale matters, such as in the automobile and 
transport equipment manufacturing sector (OECD, 2018b; WTO, 2016 – as cited in Ganne & Lundquist, 
2020), and for independent SMEs (i.e., those not owned by a larger domestic firm or foreign firm – OECD, 
2018c – as cited in Ganne & Lundquist, 2020). Evidence shows that SMEs tend to channel their indirect 
exports through large firms rather than through other SMEs (Cusolito et al., 2016 – as cited in Ganne & 
Lundquist, 2020). While evidence-based on indirect exports shows a higher level of integration of SMEs in 
GVCs in OECD countries, indirect exports appear to play a lesser role in developing countries. Using data 
from World Bank Enterprise Surveys, the WTO estimated that indirect exports of manufacturing SMEs from 
developing countries were 2.4 per cent of total sales on average, or one-third the estimated share of direct 
exports (WTO, 2016 – as cited in Ganne & Lundquist, 2020).  
In many cases, lead firms have passed the risk burden along the supply chain to 
vulnerable small businesses in LMICs (ITC, 2020). As a result, disruptions cause reductions in 
employment and bankruptcies, as well as insufficient supply to the lead firm and its customers. 
The ITC (2020) report mention several solutions beyond investments in strengthening the 
resilience of small-scale suppliers, but also to strengthen the links that these firms have with 
supply chains:  
• Better contracts with SME suppliers can facilitate the sharing of risk. Indeed, when 
buyers provide risk insurance services through contracts, it can attract suppliers and 
encourage them to invest in producing higher-quality output to foster long-term stable 
buyer-supplier relationships (ITC, 2020).  
• Lead firms should redesign their approach to collaboration and costing with SME 
suppliers to ensure more equally shared value. The mutual trust that results encourages 
the sharing of information and collective action to withstand challenges. This ‘social 
capital’ in the supply chain can be crucial to transmitting information and funds as 
necessary to respond to crises (ITC, 2020).   
• The way that the supply chain is managed and developed over time can foster an 
agile work culture that improves the capacity to adapt. Such an approach implies 
embracing rather than rejecting supply chains and acknowledging that trade and open 
markets are not a hindrance in building national resilience to shocks caused by virus 
outbreaks or other external factors (ITC, 2020). 
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Ganne and Lundquist (2020) and an IMF (2020) report on SMEs participation in GVCs also 
highlight the importance of e-commerce and digitalisation for SMEs to participate in GVCs and 
their linkages with larger firms as e-commerce: a) reduces costs to participate in GVCs, b) is an 
enabler of alternative business participation in GVC, and c) will create opportunities for new 
business models. Support is needed to enable SMEs to benefit from these advantages (see 
more in Chapter 8). 
 Covid-19 and the green transformation of GVCs 
Building sustainable GVCs  
Sarkis et al. (2020) foresee four potential shifts in supply and production activities in GVCs that 
could trigger both economical and sustainable recovery from the current health and economic 
crisis.  
• Change in behaviour: During the pandemic service providers are learning a great deal 
about the operational features of their digital systems improving the quality and ease of 
use quickly, while users become further normalised to work with such systems, which 
could result in less physical travel.  
• Change in localisation: The exposed vulnerability of overreliance on just-in-time and 
lean delivery systems due to Covid-19 could result in smarter logistics systems, including 
reverse logistics for secondary materials and waste products and enabled by internet of 
things technologies. This could make local sourcing easier, replacing extensive 
transportation of processed goods over long distances with intermediate storage, depots, 
and material reserves. Recovered plastics and metals can be used as feedstocks for 3D 
printing, and these applications can provide opportunities for locally recycled materials 
and other by-products derived from local waste exchanges or eco-industrial parks. 
• Distancing and technology: New advances in digital automation and cyber-physical 
systems are enabling the implementation of decentralised manufacturing operations. 
These technological capabilities are valuable for social distancing while maintaining 
production. Robotics provide the added advantage that they can be directly operated 
over longer distances. 
• Data information: More specifically, blockchain, internet of things, and radio-frequency 
identification sensor technologies provide for enhanced traceability and transparency in 
value chains. In addition, enhanced risk monitoring systems can be integrated with 
satellite technology and artificial intelligence. Such arrangements could save time, 
resources, and energy – especially at moments when it is important to know in real-time 
where critical materials are situated in complex supply chains. 
Sarkis et al. (2020) predict that such change can only occur if governments are willing to 
invest and support such changes. Different dynamics could influence such decisions. For 
example, finance ministers are in need to find new sources of public revenue, which may be an 
opportunity to impose substantially higher taxes on fossil fuels. On the other hand, governments 
could also be under pressure for a quick fix by revitalising national economies to disengage on 
climate change and to do all that is possible to put people back to work compromising on 
environmental issues.  
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Meester et al. (2020) mention the importance of the European Green Deal in the debate of 
a green recovery from Covid-19, in which the European Commission pledged to fund greener 
transport and cleaner energy, as measures that prevail sustainable and green recovery. 
According to Meester et al. (2020), this EU ambition could have an international effect 
beyond the EU borders. They mention the example of Dutch companies who released a joined 
statement endorsing a strong focus on sustainable GVCs rather than specifically on the 
sustainability goals of European companies. Such transitions in GVCs imply ethical choices 
regarding who will bear the brunt of the costs not only for this crisis but also for green recovery. 
Blyde (2020) indeed mentions that there is a natural tension concerning trade and 
environmental policies. On the one hand, the increasing environmental requirements imposed 
by industrial countries are sometimes seen as unilateral protectionist actions that could increase 
production costs and, thus, harm the competitiveness exports from LMICs. On the other hand, 
and these requirements might be viewed as an opportunity to innovate and differentiate 
production, allowing firms to enter more competitive supply chains (or move along more 
profitable stages), resulting in potentially higher export prices and profits while improving energy 
efficiency (Blyde, 2020). Covid-19 has increased the awareness of global lead firms about the 
environment and climate change as there are concerns of major future natural and health 
disruption. For GVC firms in LMICs this could result in higher importance to enable 
capacities to comply with environmental standards and regulations (Blyde, 2020).  
Kenner (2020) also mentions that firms will take notice of the future impact of decarbonisation, 
particularly if companies are incentivised to reduce their carbon costs through re-shoring 
strategies. Targeted decarbonisation policies and interventions could make production 
closer to the market more attractive for some sectors.  
Green logistics 
Green logistics is mainly focussing on lowering the carbon footprint of the logistics 
behind GVCs. This can be done by ever more efficient logistics, low or zero-CO2 emissions of 
transportation, and relocation closer to the market. Covid-19 makes this already complex task 
more difficult as companies have to deal with more controls at borders and disruption of 
production and demand. As we have seen in this review, with new strategies looking for more 
resilience, firms could expand diversity, increase supply networks, look seek for cost reduction. 
Therefore, it still has to be seen what will happen with green logistics in GVC. The literature on 
green logistics and Covid-19 is not abundant. Some business sources that promote green 
logistics expect an increase in calls for ecological and resource-saving logistic concepts 
and solutions.21 However, real evidence that this already happens due to Covid-19 is lacking.  
With a number of influential factors such as delivery times, order amounts and stock quantities, 
transport routes and the deployment of resources, logistics could appear too complex for clear 
and fast decision-making, particularly during the pandemic. However, by evaluating processes, 
data and cross-dependencies, even complex logistic tasks that include environmental and 
climate change issues can be solved efficiently. For example, daily route planning about 
 
21 See for example Optano, which published two articles about green logistics regarding Covid-19: https://optano.com/en/green-
logistics-a-fashion-trend-or-a-chance-to-differentiate/ and https://optano.com/en/green-logistics-the-chance-in-the-covid-19-
crisis/ (both accessed in September 2020). 
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optimal capacity and avoiding empty runs, reduces costs and is good for the 
environment.  
Case study on electric vehicles and GVCs 
A report by Deloitte (Woodward et al., 2020) on the production and sales of electric 
vehicles is optimistic that the current pandemic will continue to increase the market share 
of electric vehicles worldwide. Although due to Covid-19 and the anticipated economic 
recession, annual car sales are unlikely to reach pre-Covid-19 levels until 2024, the report 
forecasts that the pace of recovery is mainly a result of a slowdown in petrol sales; “electric 
vehicles EVs will continue to have a positive trajectory during the COVID-19 recovery period and 
may well end up capturing a disproportionate share of the market in the short term” (Woodward 
et al., 2020, p.). 
The Deloitte (2020) report estimates that a third of all new cars sold globally will be 
electric by the end of this decade as petrol and diesel vehicles “likely reached their sales 
peak” during the pandemic. China is seen as the global leader in demand and production of 
electric vehicles, with a domestic market share of electric vehicles estimated at 48% in 2030 
(Woodward et al., 2020), followed by Europe at around 42%, while the USA is behind with a 
domestic market share of 27% (Woodward et al., 2020).  
In a previous report, Deloitte (2019) had identified that new entrants in the production of electric 
vehicles would mainly be Chinese firms. However, the majority of the increase in production will 
come from established automotive firms. The 2019 report also warned of a gap between the 
production and consumer demand for electric vehicles, where the industry heavily invests 
in increasing the production capacities, while demand will grow with a lower pace. This 
would increase pressure on incumbent electric vehicle makers (start-ups and established brands) 
and could according to Deloitte (2019, p.11) result in “the prospect of today’s powerful OEMs 
acting as white label suppliers to other brands now a real possibility”. However, with the 
increasing awareness of consumers about climate change and air pollution during the pandemic, 
the gap could be less severe in 2030 as anticipated.  
The push for electric cars is also strategic and will change automotive GVCs. Sundaram et al. 
(2018) showed that supply networks will change dramatically with the shift to electric cars 
as other (and less) components are needed for the production.22 Also, electric vehicles 
could become part of the circular economy principle as major components such as 
batteries and drive units are designed for remanufacturing and re-use (Sundaram et al., 
2018). This is in line with the expectation of a study by Masiero et al. (2017) on the GVC of 
electric vehicles, that foresees a boom in recycling industry linking to the electric vehicle GVC. 
However, Bonsu (2020) mentions that there are views amongst stakeholders on weaknesses on 
lack of business model addressing value chain circular and low-carbon solutions; particularly, 
increasingly ethical issues with raw minerals.  
 
22 The production of electric vehicles has the advantage of being simpler, requiring less use and replacement parts such as 
gearboxes, fuel pumps, filters, injectors, radiators. As such they also need less maintenance and spare parts after production, 
which could have main influence on the suppliers of these parts. However, the production costs continue to be substantially 
higher, especially in the production of batteries, which currently present one of the major technology challenges to overcome, 
although technical improvements and mass production will reduce these costs (source: Masiero et al., 2017). 
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At the moment, electric vehicles are not yet produced within fully developed GVCs 
(Masiero et al., 2017). By conducting interviews with electric vehicle producers in Japan and 
South Korea the researchers conclude that in both countries the high cost of components, the 
high complexity of integration, and the lack of maturity of suppliers are the key barriers toward 
the industry's consolidation globally. New entrants in the value chain are very much likely, 
such as software firms and firms that produce sensors. New entrants into the GVC will 
disrupt, increase new partnerships, and create opportunities and risks for existing suppliers 
(Deloitte, 2019; McKinsey, 2019).23  
Importantly, what the impact of this is on countries that have been successfully integrated 
within the GVC of petrol cars has to be seen. It will depend on major investments in R&D, 
state support for the electric vehicle industry, and capacities within the labour force to 
shift more to electronic systems. MICs with strong electronics sectors could have the 
advantage to link this sector with domestic or foreign lead firms active in the production of electric 
vehicles. Masiero et al. (2017) show with a case study on Brazil that there are many 
opportunities for Brazil to integrate within the emerging GVC of electric vehicles. Japanese and 
South Korean executives in the automotive industry mentioned that, although companies need to 
overcome specific technical challenges, firms might be willing to seek efficiencies in the 
production and supply of components outside their national borders. Producers in Japan and 
South Korea were committed to capturing the value of GVC segments. This will not only increase 
exports opportunities for MICs, but also ensure access to world-class inputs for the major car 
makers. 
For Brazil, as an example, the development of electronic systems in electric vehicles, 
such as the Battery Management System (BMS), is seen as an excellent opportunity to 
insert itself into the emerging value chain since the country is recognised worldwide in 
software development (Masiero et al., 2017). Competences regarding the development of 
batteries, control systems, and electric engine technology already exist in Brazilian universities, 
research institutes, and traditional automobile industry and suppliers. However, a 
strong integrator that could align efforts more effectively to create local projects is currently 
lacking. Thus, federal and local governments could undertake a more active role in the 
development of such GVCs.  
Because of the opportunities in the industry, countries anticipate with initiatives to stimulate 
domestic production of electric vehicles. For example, Indonesia could be set to see 
rapid electric vehicle growth thanks to presidential decree 55/2019, which places stimulation of 
the electric vehicles market alongside energy efficiency and security; and clean air quality.24 
Under the terms of the new legislation, the nation is expecting electric vehicles to make up 20% 
of the vehicle market by 2025. While the decree offers support to electric vehicles importers for a 
limited time, the bulk of the incentives available are targeted at vehicles made from domestic 
 
23 Volkswagen announced their openness to share their electric vehicles platform with other leading actors in the market (in the 
literature often named as OEMs – Original Equipment Manufacturer). Tier-1 suppliers and OEMs are intensifying their 
cooperation and are building strategic partnerships. For example, engineers from Daimler and Bosch are working together, 
collocated in two locations to develop hardware and software. OEMs are also moving closer to strategically important tier-2 
suppliers and tech companies and are using directed-buy or “direct buy” (by OEM) mechanisms for the sourcing of key 
components, and to gain access to IP, shape IP development, or secure critical supply (source: Mc Kinsey, 2019). 
24 Source: https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/12/04/indonesia-plans-domestic-electric-vehicle-industry/ (accessed September 
2020). 
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components and at the providers of battery swap services and battery waste recycling, charging 
station installers and companies which accelerate the roll-out of other electric vehicles 
infrastructure. In terms of domestic components, two-wheel electric vehicles must have at least 
40% Indonesian parts to qualify for subsidy from 2023 onwards and at least 80% from 2026. 
Four-wheel vehicles must be at least 35% made in Indonesia by 2021 and 80% by 2030.25 
 Supporting resilience building in GVCs 
Covid-19 specific interventions 
Specific measures to support companies during the Covid-19 crisis have proven to be important 
for firms. For example, the ITC (2020) Covid-19 business survey said that tax waivers, temporary 
tax relief and financial programmes are amongst the most helpful government measures. This 
shows that in the short-term (i.e. during the crisis) firms face is a liquidity crisis 
accompanying the health crisis (ITC, 2020). GVCs need to be maintained and operations 
supported. Some examples come from the ITC (2020) report: 
• Policymakers seem to target actions to safeguard export-oriented businesses. In 
Bangladesh, for example, the government committed to pay the wages of employees in 
export-oriented industries. The Philippines has exempted export-oriented industries and 
business process outsourcing from the shutdown. In Pakistan, accelerated tax refunds 
are being granted to companies in export industries.  
• Trade finance helps cash-strapped small businesses keep their export clients and 
is particularly relevant for firms that export to compensate for lower local demand. For 
example, the Export Credit Bank of Turkey extended its credit repayment periods by two 
to six months and stretched its rediscount credit terms to two years.  
• To facilitate trade and reduce domestic prices, many countries are waiving customs 
fees. For example, China reduced cargo dues and port facility fees by 20% over 1 
March–30 June 2020. Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates is exempting all bulk goods 
from port storage fees for 90 days and has cut the tariff for truck parking at ports by 50%.  
• Some countries are changing their border procedures to encourage timely 
issuance of international commercial documents. Indonesia, for instance, has 
introduced accelerated customs procedures for reputable traders and authorised 
economic operators. Government legal services – issuing force majeure certificates and 
legal advisory services, for example – can be particularly relevant for SMEs that export, 
because they may face more business disputes as cargos become blocked in transit. 
Increasing resilience within GVCs takes time and the short-term measures should be linked with 
longer-term policies and interventions that give incentives to cope with the after-match of the 
crisis and prepare for the next crisis. Incentives should be linked with the strategies mentioned in 
Chapter 6 to support firms (lead firms and SMEs) to increasing their resilience. 
 
 
 
25 Source: https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/12/04/indonesia-plans-domestic-electric-vehicle-industry/ (accessed September 
2020). 
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Figure 7. Main policy recommendations for GVCs in times of Covid-19 
 
Source: OECD, 2020, p.9 
OECD (2020, p.8) mentions that in the recovery phase, GVCs can play an important role in 
ensuring supply by “reducing the time needed for production to reach pre-crisis levels”. As such, 
the report recommends that maintaining an open trade and investment environment is 
critical, while also addressing the requests of firms that may need specific and time-
limited support to recover. Figure 6 shows the OECD (2020, p.9) recommendations in different 
phases (crisis, recovery, new normal). On reshoring incentives (e.g. fiscal incentives, relax labour 
or environmental standards to compensate for additional costs), the OECD is, like many other 
sources, reluctant given the lack of evidence that domestic supply chains fared any better than 
international supply chains during the COVID-19 crisis, “the additional economic and social risks 
of extensive re-shoring policies and nationalisation far outweigh any perceived gains in terms of 
security of supply” (OECD, 2020, p.9).  
The literature on supporting resilience does not seem to emphasise for a new direction of 
support for lead firms and suppliers (larger or smaller) in a post-Covid world. Most 
recommendations seem to be a continuation of older ones with an emphasis on e-commerce and 
digitalisation. Lead firms could push for more digital solutions and interactions within GVCs. For 
example, the literature on Lead firm-SME linkage programmes seems not to advocate for a 
completely different agenda but accelerate support with a focus on digitalisation and e-
commerce.  
Supporting e-commerce: what do we know? 
What are those recommendations? The GVC Development Report 2019 (WTO, OECD, World 
Bank, 2019) mentions that designing domestic policies to enhance the benefits of GVC 
participation for domestic firms (while addressing potential adjustment costs, mainly for SMEs), 
includes the enhancement of connectivity by investing in infrastructure and digital 
technologies combined with free trade and investment policies. Governments would do well 
to develop a comprehensive digital strategy to maximise the gains from GVCs, the report states, 
recommending a holistic approach of investing in information and communication technology and 
in training along with undertaking measures to improve trade openness, the business 
environment and innovation (WTO, 2019).  
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As lead firms have the capacities to do this, targeted support is mainly needed for SMEs 
to prevent them from losing out. SMEs’ access and use of digital technologies remains 
constrained by various factors, in particular a reliable internet connection (Fernandes et al., 
2017). When it comes to e-commerce, the most important technological requirement remains 
basic access to the internet. It is therefore vital that governments provide their business sector 
(and in particular SMEs), with affordable, high-quality internet infrastructure (Ganne & Lindquist, 
2020). Mobile technology is increasingly important for businesses, and governments should 
support both mobile infrastructure and efforts to create mobile-friendly, paperless e-government 
systems (Ganne & Lindquist, 2019).  
However, in MICs, many SMEs have internet access, but they often have limited 
understanding or capability to leverage the internet as part of their business plan (Cusolito 
et al., 2016). Further, the gap in technological adoption by SMEs relative to large firms remains in 
part because of other missing components such as insufficient R&D, human resources, and 
organisational and process innovation (OECD, 2018). For example, an important pillar for e-
commerce is e-payment systems; however, there is still a lack of trust and obstructions for SMEs 
to use e-payment platforms (Lukonga, 2020). ITC (2017) survey showed that insufficient 
knowledge of online marketing tools, or technical skills, was one of the key reasons put forward 
to explain the lack of online visibility for these firms. Improving online visibility requires more than 
simply having a webpage or access to an online platform; it requires specific digital skills to 
master online marketing techniques (ITC, 2017).  
To promote SME participation in GVCs, the literature (e.g. Ganne & Lindquist, 2019) mention 
that policymakers need to ensure that SMEs and workers have the digital skills and 
knowledge to use ICT technologies efficiently in the different business functions involved 
in international trade, from market research, to product development, sourcing, production, sale, 
and after-sale services, and actively support the development of ICT (and mobile) infrastructure, 
which is even more important in the Covid-19 crisis (Ganne & Lindquist, 2019). 
Lukongo (2020) shows that in North Africa, Middle East, and Pakistan policies to promote SME 
growth and employment have not had the envisioned success, thus a fundamental re-thinking of 
the strategy for developing SMEs is needed. Partial implementation of reforms and 
idiosyncratic factors contributed to the underperformance, but frictions in the design of 
SME policies also played important roles, according to Lukongo (2020). Firms will need to 
embrace agility through digital to address the ever-faster changing business environment 
(Lukongo, 2020). Overall, a well-articulated strategy that addresses supply and demand 
constraints to digital adoption by businesses complemented by sustained efforts to implement 
financial sector and the business support reforms is the key to success. To cite (Lukongo, 2020, 
p.41): 
“Regulatory sandboxes can help enhance supervisory communications with market 
participants, accelerate digital transformation of traditional entities and improve their 
knowledge of technologies, market development, and application of regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks. Risks will, however, need to be addressed, including ensuring 
an even playing field between fully regulated entities and those operating in the sandbox 
to avoid regulatory arbitrage (Wilson 2019).” 
When it comes to digital trade, particular consideration ought to be given to laws and 
regulations that relate to the flow of data, consumer protection, and the recognition of 
digital documents and signatures. Although countries may unilaterally enact many reforms to 
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improve the trading environment, especially in the area of digital trade, other measures related to 
data privacy rules and standards, data movement, and recognition of e-contracts may require 
international cooperation (Lanz et al., 2018).  
Supporting SME participation in GVCs: what do we know? 
More general support programmes to the private sector and value chain development 
mainly focus on SMEs and their challenges for participation (Quak, 2019; World Bank, 
2018). The ADB (2015) surveyed enterprises on 19 policy items that could encourage greater 
participation of SMEs in GVCs by linking them to lead firms. The top five comprised of tax 
incentives for small suppliers (now tax incentives mainly include lead firms), trade facilitation 
measures, simplification of trade procedures, improving domestic infrastructure, and reforms in 
ICT and transport. The study (ADB, 2015) noted that SMEs that succeeded to link with global 
markets were significantly ahead of their counterparts in the sourcing of inputs and suppliers, 
production capacity, technology use, and networking. Although SMEs stand to benefit from 
participating in global markets many of the SMEs lack the confidence to enter the global market 
(ADB, 2015). 
A supportive enabling environment, therefore, is a critical foundation for encouraging 
business linkages between lead firms and SMEs. Governments can address these issues by 
focusing on building SME capacity, offering them financial incentives, helping smaller firms keep 
up with international standards for product quality, reducing red tape, improving infrastructure, 
and prioritising education (ADB, 2015). Enabling conditions such as ease of starting a business, 
contract enforcement, ease of hiring and firing employees, absence of corruption (e.g., bribes), 
and transparent taxation are important to SME and lead firm operations. Instead of mandatory or 
restrictive policies such as imposing local content requirements on MNEs working with SMEs, 
governments should focus on connecting different companies through information dissemination 
and competent delivery of basic services (Botelho & Bourguignon, 2011).     
Resilience building in GVCs starts with firms themselves implementing a coherent 
strategy, while supported by governments through policies, interventions, and 
programmes. In addition, support should also come from business support organisations, 
which can from their side be supported by international organisations to provide technical 
assistance to small businesses, such as training and advisory services to implement new 
standards (OECD, 2020; ITC, 2020). Business support organisations must continue to deliver on 
their mandate, even though they are themselves facing health concerns, teleworking challenges, 
and risks to their sources of revenue (ITC, 2020). Business support organisations can provide 
information on Covid-19 from a business perspective. They are also in a great position to 
shoulder some of the risks when entering new markets or international supply chains. 
Businesses working together can reduce costs through shared procurement, create economies 
of scale and access new opportunities by sharing knowledge and resources (ITC, 2020).  
Good business support organisations benefit from their knowledge of business, their 
convening power and their credibility to represent micro and small enterprises and make 
their needs known among policymakers and funders (ITC, 2020). The aim should be to make 
management systems resilient and ensure product quality and safety. Most importantly, there 
should be closer collaboration and coordination among international organisations, business 
support organisations and regulatory bodies to work together in assisting small businesses and 
ensuring a fair business environment (ITC, 2020). 
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